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
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# Intelligence Memorandum

*Issues, Few Answers:*

*Soviet Leaders Address the Electorate*

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27 July 1970  
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
27 July 1970

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Issues, Few Answers: Soviet Leaders

Address the Electorate

Summary

During the two and a half weeks preceding elections to the Supreme Soviet on 14 June 1970, top Soviet leaders repaired to their districts to deliver traditional electoral addresses. The result was a rare opportunity to hear nearly all members and candidate members of the politburo and central committee secretaries speaking within the same narrow confines of time and circumstances. Their addresses provide a useful gauge of the range and division of thinking within the regime on important matters such as resource allocations, economic management, and foreign policy.

The comparative portrait of the leaders is, of course, not complete. The leaders did not make wholly individual presentations, but generally followed an already prescribed pattern similar to that of the central committee election appeal announced on 16 May. There was great disparity in how fully the speeches of senior and junior members of the leadership were reported. One member of the leadership, Ustinov, merely sent a letter to his electorate because illness prevented his appearance.

The speeches nevertheless did show two things rather clearly: 1) a general coalescence of the leadership on the question of increasing agricultural investments and 2) a slight retreat by Kosygin

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on some matters of official responsibility and customary concern. He was notably reticent concerning the next five-year plan, and he spoke of economic reform in the past rather than the future tense.

Otherwise, the leaders appeared to be at an impasse on most issues. The alliances evident on different issues were as varying as the issues. In the absence of policy decisions the leaders avoided excessive displays of partisanship on most questions. The impression left is that the policy impasse will not be broken until there is some reshuffling of officeholders.

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### Resource Allocations

1. Most of the leaders mentioned the five-year plan for 1971-75, whose main directives are to be approved by the Party Congress in March 1971. The vagueness of their remarks on the priority the plan will give to various sectors of the economy suggested that basic decisions had not yet been taken. The leaders' divergent treatment of these sectors, however, probably reflected the positions some of them were adopting in allocation debates behind the scenes. Although Brezhnev had the most to say about the plan's features, he also seemed to warn against bringing such debate too far into the open or taking anything for granted when he counseled that, while work continued on the plan, "it would be premature to speak about concrete figures and assignments." Kosygin, who has closest responsibility for its elaboration, maintained an almost studied imprecision.

2. The subject of strongest and widest agreement among the leaders was the importance of investment in agriculture. The leaders, however, expressed varying degrees of urgency on the question.

3. Brezhnev offered an unusually persuasive argument for a program to transform the agricultural sector at an accelerated pace rather than at one stretching out to perhaps 25 years. He said that, having adopted other organizational and incentive measures, "it became even more obvious" that any great increase in production depended on the creation of a modern material-technical base, that is, on investment. Polyansky and Kulakov, who have formal responsibility for agriculture, made similarly strong claims for more resources. Polyansky said that the "tasks of creating an abundance of agricultural products" required improving the balance between the development of industry and of agriculture. Kulakov implied that the central committee at its plenum in December 1969 had blamed insufficient agricultural development on the sector's inadequate material and technical base, and he declared that

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the creation of such a base would be a central task of the next five-year plan. Although these three advocates did not explicitly call for agriculture to receive a larger share of total investments than in the past, this was the thrust of their arguments.

4. Others were less committed, but most appeared sympathetic. Podgorny promised considerably increased capital investments for agriculture, and Kirilenko predicted unprecedented deliveries of equipment and fertilizer. The central committee's appeal to the voters had stated the need to strengthen agriculture's material-technical base, and this language was repeated by Suslov, Masharov, Pelshe, Kunayev, Rashidov, Solomentsev, and Demichev. Others, including Kosygin, Mazurov, Shelepin, Shelest, Kapitonov, and Katushev, simply called for increased agricultural production without defining the means.

5. Voronov was the only leader to argue forcefully for an agricultural program that would serve as an alternative to increased investment. He disregarded the state of agriculture's material-technical base and urged instead a struggle to reduce production costs. As in the past, he focused on labor organization and remuneration and lauded the successes of the link system. Shcherbitsky limited himself to noting that preconditions for an upsurge in agricultural production were being created and that substantial shortcomings still hamper its development.

6. The general solicitude toward agriculture was probably impelled by last year's poor harvest. Many of the leaders admitted that food supplies had not kept up with demand. Masharov felt obliged to interrupt his speech to answer written questions received before the meeting concerning meat supplies. He acknowledged shortages in Belorussian cities, including the capital, Minsk, and laid blame on the meat industry and trade. Bad weather was mentioned as a reason for agricultural and economic difficulties by Podgorny, Kirilenko, Polyansky, and Kulakov, all strong supporters of investment. Polyansky clearly connected the weather factor and the need for investment when, in discussing the work to be done in rural

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reconstruction, he observed that agriculture is still a sector of production whose success is subject to climatic conditions. On the other hand, Voronov, speaking at Minsk in March, had rebuked those who blamed last year's bad weather for all difficulties.

7. There was less agreement on priorities for other sectors of the economy. Brezhnev and Podgorny gave foremost place to heavy industry in the next five-year plan and stressed that those industries at modern technology's cutting edge must grow at a particularly rapid rate. This was the formulation contained in the party's election appeal. Similar priorities were also outlined by Masherov, Kunayev, and Rashidov in explaining their own republics' five-year plans.

8. Most of the remaining leaders seemed to register opposition to this line by failing to mention heavy industry. In the majority of cases, however, they gave hardly more than perfunctory support to consumer welfare. No one mentioned the actual ratio between the growth rates of producer and consumer industries during the next five years. Kosygin did point with pride to the success in closing the gap in 1966-70. Shelepin, Voronov, and Pelshe promised more consumer goods in the next five-year plan, but this was no more than was promised by Podgorny. Voronov, moreover, displaying characteristic concern that central expenditures be kept down, stressed the role of local government in meeting this task. Mazurov and Shelepin appeared to link their mild support of agriculture with the expectation that light industry would receive equal treatment. Brezhnev, Suslov, Kirilenko, and Kunayev promised higher wages, improved pension security, better labor and welfare conditions for working mothers, and greater benefits for students. These measures were listed in the party's appeal and are not necessarily connected with consumer production.

9. To explain in part the shortfalls in satisfying consumer demand, two leaders turned to the

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international situation and defense needs. This rationale, of course, may be directed at future policy as well as past. After referring to "the hotbeds of tension" being created by the US, Podgorny noted that this factor is a consideration in planning the USSR's development and requires allocation of a portion of funds and material resources. Kirilenko explained that implementation of the current five-year plan had "been complicated by a number of circumstances, mainly by the fact that the international situation continues to remain tense and has repeatedly been dangerously exacerbated."

10. Nevertheless, direct references to defense were no more plentiful or substantive than were those to heavy industry. Without speaking of future policy, the party's appeal had declared that the Soviet people "are strengthening the defense capability of the socialist state in every way and doing everything necessary to supply the army and navy with the newest equipment, with awe-inspiring perfect weapons." Suslov came closest to this language when he warned that US policy "demands that we do not slacken our vigilance for one minute, and that we tirelessly improve our country's defense and arm the Soviet Army and Navy with the most modern weapons." Kirilenko gave assurance that "our party and government will do everything to strengthen the Soviet Union's defense might" and said that the contemporary situation disallows relaxation of this effort. Brezhnev stressed the "great significance" the government attaches to strengthening defense capacity and voiced the intention not to relax concern for the armed forces. Among other general remarks on defense, Kosygin said, "The defensive might of the Soviet state must be invincible in the full sense of the word." Podgorny, Shelest, Kunayev, and Ponomarev made briefer references to strengthening defense, the remaining speakers avoided the subject entirely.

11. Overall, then, a lack of a sense of direction in the leadership extended to all sectors

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except agriculture. Only Brezhnev, Podgorny, and Kunayev showed some consistency in their discussions of heavy industry and defense. Other supporters of defense shunned mention of heavy industry. The majority of the leadership also avoided the subject; however, they had little more to say for consumers than did the advocates of heavy industry. This is an indicator, first, of the unresolved state of the leadership on questions of allocations and, second, of the unwillingness of most of the leaders to express decisively individual preferences on these questions.

#### Economic Management

12. Since the central committee plenum in December 1969, the question of economic management has been in the forefront of public discussion, and it was bound to find its way into the election speeches. The approaches of the leaders can be put into three categories: attitudes toward the economic reform begun in 1965, attitudes toward the application of science and technology to production, and attitudes toward a new stage of "scientific management" involving greater or lesser measures of rationalization and computerization. Regarded this way, the speeches yield some surprises. Brezhnev and Shelest, while maintaining their usual distance from the reforms of 1965, joined with the Belorussians Mazurov and Masherov in identifying with some form of scientific management for the future. Kosygin, although stoutly defending the results of the reform he was instrumental in launching, gave a conservative interpretation of its principles and offered nothing visionary for the future.

13. Mazurov's defense of the economic reform was unique in singling out its more liberal elements and projecting them into the future. In Belorussia, he stated, the "fact that in the last four years labor productivity increased at a more rapid pace than envisaged in the five-year plan must necessarily be attributed to the skillful utilization of the principles of the economic reform." With the reform now

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implemented at the enterprise level, Mazurov called for extension of its principles upward and downward, to the organs of economic management and to every workplace. An essential principle of the reform, he made clear, is that, in combining material and moral incentives, the moral must not conflict with the material. Use of the profit motive, in fact, improves the moral climate, he said.

14. Mazurov announced that the reform is now entering a new phase, characterized by a search for the most rational system of management. He cited the creation of associations of enterprises to eliminate administrative layers. He also advanced "a systems approach that embraces all basic aspects of the economy in their totality" and embodies "the general interests of the state." If carried out, both schemes would alter the strict departmental organization adopted in 1965. By advocating the adoption of the systems or interdepartmental approach to the development of agricultural and consumer goods production, he was arguing in effect that these sectors should receive the type of comprehensive direction that military production has traditionally enjoyed. Mazurov described this approach as working against both localism and departmentalism, but he did not conceal that the coordinating effort involved would mean a larger role for republic and local executive organs. Whatever its limitations, Mazurov's "systems approach" stood out as the fullest and freshest projection of future possibilities enunciated by the Soviet leaders to their electorates.

15. Kosygin's defense of the economic reform pales beside it. His determined but labored statement included a denial of Western claims that the reform constituted a departure from socialist planned management. Kosygin reaffirmed the centralist side of the principle of democratic centralism and repeated the call for discipline raised at the December plenum. Other elements of the reform were mentioned in passing, and its achievements were modestly praised in general terms. Although Kosygin referred to "perfecting" the reform, his discussion of the future was limited to advocating

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"streamlining" economic management to eliminate bureaucratic layers and to improve industrial specialization. He revealed that the party and government had recently taken a decision to reorganize the chemical, oil, and coal industries as the first step in this process. He avoided mention of associations or the experiment under way to transfer the entire Ministry of Instrument Building, Means of Automation and Control to the reform system.

16. Kosygin and Mazurov, who have borne chief responsibility for implementing the reform, appeared to receive some guarded backing from Podgorny, Polyansky, Pelshe, Shelepin, and Voronov. Podgorny cited the importance of "fuller use of the economic laws of socialism." In this regard, he said the reform, despite shortcomings, had shown its effectiveness. Polyansky declared that the greatest output "has been from enterprises that have switched over to the new system of planning and economic stimulation." Pelshe spoke of the reform in terms of developing socialist democracy and of releasing the individual's creative powers to accelerate technical progress and improve management and labor organization. The economy's development and improvement during the past four years, Shelepin said, occurred "under conditions of implementing the new economic reform and the scientific-technological revolution." He also praised his Leningrad audience for pioneering in the formation of associations. Voronov declared that "the new economic reform is producing positive results" but warned that it is a "complicated and painstaking matter" requiring "constant attention from all of us." Brezhnev merely commented that "we have learned much" from the reform, and the others ignored the subject.

17. Such unequal and, for the most part, scanty treatment of the reform is remarkable considering how large it has loomed in the domestic program of the Soviet leadership for the past five years. Pravda added further insult by deleting the references to

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the reform made by Podgorny, Polyansky, and Pelshe. Several factors may account for the limited coverage. Officials and economists have been outspoken in recent months about the complications encountered in carrying out the reform and its failure to yield all of the expected results. Its elements were a matter of controversy and compromise from the start and are no doubt still a source of disagreement among the leadership. Also, the reform is closely associated with individual careers. Thus, while Kosygin and Mazurov have an interest in recording the success of the reform, others, for example Brezhnev and Polyansky, might consider extensive praise as unwanted promotion of their political opposite numbers. General Secretary Brezhnev has not been an enthusiastic reformer, but he did have more to say about future reform in his election speech than about the past reform.

18. As hope for an economic windfall from the reform has faded, attention has been directed more intensely on the possibilities to be realized in the scientific and technological revolution. Although leaders may dispute the form of management that will best foster scientific and technological applications in production, their speeches show that they are all the more interested in this process itself and in the "miracles" science can work.

19. Masharov adopted science and technology as a major theme of his speech. He noted a recent Belorussian central committee plenum devoted to the subject and a resolution it passed "On Measures for the Further Development of Science and the Strengthening of its Links with Production." The new five-year plan period, he said, must witness "a nationwide struggle for an increase in the efficiency and further intensification of all public production on the basis of the extensive introduction of scientific and technical achievements and the intensification and development of scientific methods of planning and economic incentive." This priority task determined his choice of industries for special emphasis and his preference for agricultural investments. The subject was also a major theme in Shelest's speech. "The main

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economic task of the new five-year plan," he said, "will consist of comprehensively utilizing scientific and technical achievements, improving methods of managing the economy...." After noting the importance of economic competition with the West, he declared, "Figuratively speaking, we must go to the top of the class, a class that is more complex and responsible." Kosygin was a third leader who spoke at length on the subject, announcing that "one of the major tasks of the next five-year period must be the technical reconstruction in industry."

20. Most top leaders, including Brezhnev, Podgorny, Kirilenko, Mazurov, and Shelepin, devoted a number of paragraphs to science and technology. Podgorny cited the voyage of Soyuz 9, then in its tenth day of orbiting the earth, as new evidence of successes. Grishin claimed that technical re-equipment of enterprises in Moscow would result in a two- or three-fold increase in industrial production during the next seven to ten years without additional workers. Other speakers mentioned the topic in passing. In Voronov's discussion the subject was overrun by his principal concern for minimizing costs. Pelshe tried to see it simply as a manifestation of mass participation in the management of production. Two leaders, Polyansky and Rashidov, chose to make no mention at all of the industrial applications of science and technology.

21. Economic reform and technology can be combined at the management level to create a higher synthesis, expressed by some as "scientific management." Brezhnev stated it most succinctly: "It is clear...that the solution of many economic and not only economic problems should now be sought at the merging point of scientific-technical progress and progress in management." Concurrence was evident in Mazurov's discussion of economic reform and Masherov's and Shelest's treatment of science and technology already noted above.

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22. Mazurov's attention to reforming managerial organization and its operating rationale left little space for discussion of hardware. He did, however, report that the December plenum had called "...in particular, for the introduction of new methods of organizing planning and administrative work with the use of computers." The technological bias of Masherov and Shelest was demonstrated by their emphasis on computerization, although not to the exclusion of rationalization. Masherov declared, "It is very important to overcome rapidly the unique psychological barrier relating to old work methods and distrust of new ones and to be bolder in introducing scientific forms of management based on the extensive utilization of calculating and problem-solving machines and computers." He called for the "rationalization of management--based on the latest achievements of mathematics, electronics, and cybernetics--in material production, planning, financial, supply and marketing organs, and other spheres of life." The Belorussian party and government, he reported, "have formulated measures to extend work on the introduction into the national economy of computer technology means and automated control systems." Shelest blamed economic shortcomings on "insufficient attention...still being paid to questions of scientific and technical progress and to improvement of the forms and methods of the leadership of industry and construction." "It is essential," he said, "that we strive for a position where management relies more on science, where more progressive principles of management are introduced, and where effective use is made of the great opportunities presented by automation, computers, and the latest methods of labor organization."

23. Brezhnev was less specific and more equivocal but employed language that seemed to express his interest also in this type of "scientific management." He avoided mention of computers but did point out the relationship between technological and managerial progress. "The science of victory," he said, "is actually a science of management. That is why the task of mastering the science of management and, if necessary, of learning anew is becoming a

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prime obligation of our cadres." He said that during the next five-year plan "much attention will be given to improving the planning and the management of the national economy, to a fuller utilization of economic levers." Commending a style of work that fosters confidence, initiative, and creativity among subordinates, he pledged, "We do not intend to change it, to return to the methods of ordering around that were emphatically condemned by the party." A less scientific side of his speech, however, dealt with discipline, law and order, and mass participation in management.

24. Two speakers lined up on the side of scientific management with summary statements of its elements. Kunayev stated, "To manage the economy in a Leninist and Communist manner means to rely on science, to introduce progressive management principles, and to make efficient use of the rich possibilities born of automation, computer technology, and the latest methods of organizing work in the managerial apparatus." Katushev declared, "Life insistently demands improving organization and management, planning methods, the systems of information gathering and processing, and demands effective use of computer technology in management, scientific research, economic model-building, and improving material and technical supply."

25. Despite the time Kosygin devoted to the economic reform and to science and technology, at no place did he draw the two closely together. His comments on future reform were confined to "streamlining" the structure of administration. Computerization was passed over completely and "introducing scientific management plans and labor organization" almost so. A possible explanation for his reticence in discussing future reform could be that many proposals would disrupt the departmental organization he saw established in 1965 and are encountering opposition from the ministerial and regulatory bureaucracies he commands.

26. Voronov, Demichev, Grishin, and Shcherbitsky likewise raised the subject of "scientific management," but in unclear terms. According to Pravda,

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Voronov typically instructed his listeners with examples showing the possibilities of improving and cutting down the management apparatus, and announced that the RSFSR had reduced 1970 management expenditures by nearly one billion rubles. Curiously, he also quoted a passage from Brezhnev's speech in Kharkov on 13 March that complained that "many of the difficulties we have encountered in the economic sphere are rooted in one or another defect in planning, in the perfection of plans, and in their adequately accurate fulfillment."

27. The rest of the leaders made only oblique references to scientific management or none at all. Many approached the problem of management in conservative terms that reflected their particular field of official responsibility. Thus, Podgorny concentrated on the workers' role in state management through the soviets. Shelepin took up labor discipline and prompted the audience to voice its approval of sanctions levied on irresponsible workers. Pelshe discussed the mission of control and verification in economic affairs. Andropov argued the necessity of strengthening the state system, through which the workers participate in solving production and state problems. Official responsibilities, however, do not explain the items Polyan-sky lumped under scientific management. These included the correct placement of cadres, reliance on the collective, the precise distribution of functions among party, soviet, economic, and public organization, and mass participation in the management of production.

28. In sum, the eve of the next five-year plan found some leaders groping for a new program which would drive the economy at accelerated rates of growth. They seemed to favor a judicious amount of rationalization through reform and a larger input of computer technology. These are hardly new or radical concepts. Undoubtedly, one virtue of such a cautious approach, given the current political climate in the Politburo, is its avoidance of anything smacking of

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market socialism. For the most part, these leaders did not express their ideas in specific, unambiguous terms. Still, they can be divided from their colleagues who contented themselves with entirely traditional approaches to management problems. The difference between Brezhnev and Kosygin seemed to be in the appearance of groping in Brezhnev's case and in preoccupation with advances already made in Kosygin's case. Podgorny, who did not neglect the economic reform or the scientific-technological revolution, abdicated even more on the question of direction of a future economic program.

#### Foreign Policy

29. Only a few of the top leaders had any lengthy comments on foreign policy published in the press or broadcast. Comparisons therefore, must be limited mostly to Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny, although a few other leaders will be briefly considered.

30. The discussion of East-West relations--and particularly US-USSR relations--by Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny swung in two opposite directions. There was, on the one hand, an almost totally negative assessment of the progress achieved to date in relations with the US and, on the other hand, an assertion of the practicability of bettering these relations in the future. Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny voiced this affirmation with greater to lesser force, in that order.

31. Although Brezhnev acknowledged "deep contradictions" between the US and the USSR, he said that these did not rule out the peaceful resolution of international problems but instead made it essential to strive for better relations. Forces in the US, he claimed, hold to the same position. He said the USSR had "positively received" President Nixon's statement on moving from an era of confrontation to one of negotiation, but he added that Washington's actions had not lived up to its words. To

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a rhetorical question on the prospects for improved relations, he said the possibility exists providing the US follows a sober and peaceful policy. Kosygin referred to President Nixon's speech announcing operations in Cambodia and asked, "How can one trust US policy?" He charged that "the aggressive forces of American imperialism" are striving to stifle the tendency of the peaceful forces found in a number of capitalist countries. "This is the main reason why relations between the Soviet Union and the United States in recent years have not developed any further." Nevertheless, he said that the Soviet Union's policy of peaceful coexistence applied to the US, and that good relations between the countries would serve the interests of the Soviet people and of peace as a whole. Podgorny noted that, although the USSR favors peaceful cooperation and maintains normal business relations with capitalist countries, this "cannot be said of our relations with the United States." These relations, he said, "are not developing and are practically in a kind of frozen state." Podgorny made no call for better US-USSR relations, saying only that the Soviet Union is always ready to seek solutions to international problems through constructive talks.

32. The top three leaders did not mention SALT, but did refer to disarmament questions in a general way. Podgorny asserted, "We are prepared to coordinate our actions with all capitalist states...for stopping the armaments race." He cited the nonproliferation treaty as evidence of the possibility of reaching agreements and said that it "creates favorable preconditions for advancement in the field of disarmament." Brezhnev said that the USSR is "striving for the practical solution of such vital international problems as containment of the arms race, banning of nuclear arms, and their nonproliferation...." The closest Kosygin came to the subject was a reference to the Warsaw Pact's initiatives "in the struggle to conclude an international treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons."

33. Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny offered a progression of formulations on relations with West

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Germany. All three saw an interplay of "realistic" and "revanchist" forces in the FRG. Brezhnev noted that "certain reassuring prospects have opened up recently" in relations with the FRG, that recent talks with the FRG have been "useful," and that the Soviet side is ready "to bring them to a positive conclusion." Kosygin also described the talks as "useful" and surmised that they would continue, but added that only "time will show their final results." Podgorny's observations were limited to explaining that the USSR approached the talks considering the forces at work in the FRG and "firmly adhering to our positions of principle."

34. The attitudes the three leaders evidenced toward China closely paralleled those they expressed toward the US. They admitted that negotiations with China were at an impasse and blamed this entirely on the other side. Despite this, Podgorny, Brezhnev, and Kosygin, in that order, adopted progressively more positive stances toward negotiations with the Chinese, if only to establish Soviet claims as peace-makers.

35. Kosygin was alone in stating explicitly that the Soviet Union intends to continue the talks with China "with a view to seeking an agreement." He reiterated the view that the interests of the Soviet and Chinese people coincide despite "the general anti-Soviet course of the Chinese leaders." The Soviets aim is to prevent relations from worsening and to normalize them at least on the state level, he said. Brezhnev commented that measures had been taken to do away with tension on the border and noted that negotiations had begun "on our initiative." He portrayed China as stepping up ideological and political attacks on the USSR, but stated that the Soviet Union stood for the earliest normalization of interstate relations "on the broadest basis." Podgorny attacked Mao by name and China's "pseudo-revolutionary" behavior. He accused the Peking leaders of calling the Soviet Union "Enemy No. 1," thus objectively joining the forces of anti-Communism." The West and the

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East, he warned, had gained convincing proof of the striking might of the Soviet armed forces in World War II. Nevertheless, he went on, the USSR stands for friendship with the Chinese people and normalization of interstate relations, which determined Soviet preparations for negotiations.

36. Kosygin's position, especially regarding relations with the West, deserves some examination. This occasion found the regime's "friend of the West" restrained and rigid, more so even than Brezhnev. Kosygin may have felt obliged, as head of government, to maintain the harsh tone he adopted as the regime's spokesman at his press conference on 4 May concerning US actions in Cambodia. Particular reasons of diplomacy may have prompted Brezhnev's less strident formulations. Nevertheless, the impression conveyed was of a reversal in habitual roles. In this situation the possibility cannot be excluded that Kosygin was finding it more difficult, either personally or within the collective, to maintain a positive stance toward the US. Besides making good propaganda, Kosygin's "How can one trust US policy?" sounded as a *cri de coeur*, and it is true that he stayed further away from the subject of disarmament than Brezhnev and Podgorny. Beyond this and in general, the discontinuity between the leaders' evaluations of present and prospective relations between the US and the USSR, however much dictated by "realities," is politically not an easy formulation to sustain.

37. The comments of some of the other leaders on these questions are worth noting. Kosygin's first deputy Mazurov offered the only direct comment on SALT. He said, "We sincerely hope for the success of Soviet-American talks in Vienna." Success, he continued, would be a boon to more than the peoples of the US and USSR, but it is possible "only if the other side demonstrates realism, good will, and a constructive approach." On the matter of peaceful coexistence, Mazurov observed that the USSR is always open to business arrangements, but that the Soviet Union cannot develop active economic relations with countries whose ruling circles pursue aggression, dictatorship, and discrimination.

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38. Suslov declared that the Soviet Union is fighting for peaceful coexistence and striving to establish equal and friendly relations with all countries. As did Podgorny, he castigated the Chinese leaders for portraying the USSR "as Enemy No. 1" and for inventing "absurdities" about conditions in the Soviet Union, for example, about a growing army of unemployed. Nevertheless, he pointed out the USSR had agreed with the Chinese Government to start talks. Suslov's reference to the aims of these talks resembled Brezhnev's: while defending principle and the inviolability of the motherland, do everything to normalize interstate relations.

39. Shelepin invoked "the Leninist principles of proletarian internationalism" as the basis of foreign policy and did not refer to peaceful coexistence. Nevertheless, he promised, "We will continue to take all measures to avert the threat of a new world war, to curtail the arms race, to adopt constructive plans for disarmament and for implementing other measures that promote relaxation of international tension." China, he said, had waged an anti-Soviet campaign for several years, camouflaging it by an alleged military threat from the USSR; positions of internationalism, however, led the Soviet Union "to act to re-establish good relations between socialist countries."

40. Shelest's only reported comment on foreign policy was inward-looking and pragmatic. Calling the Soviet people ardent patriots and internationalists, he said they understand that every production success is a blow against capitalism and the instigators of a new war.

41. A theme that was refreshing in its absence from most of the speeches was the exacerbation of the ideological struggle and the dangers of right and left revisionism. This line, which had become particularly pervasive at the time of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, had been identified with Brezhnev. Now only Demichev, party secretary for ideology and culture, devoted much of his speech to the subject.

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The low-key treatment of the ideological struggle is perhaps an indication of how successful the Soviet leaders judge they have been in liquidating the effects of the events of 1968. On the other hand, Czechoslovakia was mentioned in relation to Western attempts at subversion by Kosygin, Mazurov, and Suslov. These three were among the leaders rumored to have been inclined against the invasion in 1968.

42. Suslov and Pelshe continued the hoary practice of critically comparing Soviet and American societies according to their concepts of welfare, democracy, and spirituality. This propagandist's approach with its large doses of misrepresentation probably reflects the mold of these leaders' minds. Their statements might also have been related to their Leningrad and Latvian audiences, who are perhaps judged to be especially susceptible to the lure of the West. Pelshe admitted that the voices "of our ideological enemies" are at times heard in Latvia. He also attacked "essays" propounding the "convergence theory," an attack that appeared directly aimed at the writings of physicist Andrey Sakharov that have been published in the West.

#### State of the Leadership

43. In their election speeches the Soviet leaders presented a generally unbroken front, one that displayed no deep cleavages. The uniformity the leaders exercised in their remarks looked less like agreement on policy and programs than agreement not to display excessive partisanship in the absence of decisions. Only on the subject of the need for investment in agriculture did there seem to be a strong common direction. This in itself implies that there are disputes on other issues that are so serious that their resolution is postponed month after month. The speeches often indicated the character of the differences, if not their intensity. A tally of leaders' positions on various questions, however, shows how their alliances vary according to the question. No strong cliques appear that stick together on all issues, or even on issues that seem

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logically related. Although many individuals could be identified with a conservative, middle-of-the-road, or progressive outlook on individual questions, few were totally consistent. No sharp or consistent polarization of views was evident. If this represents the true state of affairs among the collective, it represents one element contributing to the leadership's past record of stability.

44. One area of internal controversies may have been betrayed in comments about "foreign" interpretations of the Soviet scene. Brezhnev and Shelest took note of "bourgeois" allegations of an economic "crisis" in the Soviet Union. Brezhnev went on to acknowledge that "enemies try to use our self-criticism for their purposes" but argued that this was no reason to let up on criticism. In fact, he began the current round with his economic critique at the December plenum, and there have since been signs of resistance to this campaign. Kosygin referred to "bourgeois" assertions concerning Soviet foreign and domestic policies, including an "internal struggle." This sensitivity to foreign commentary may be a measure of how close that commentary has come to matters still under discussion in the leadership.

45. Brezhnev's speech demonstrated once again his superior, but not supreme, position in the collective. His was the only speech published in full by the central press, where it received almost twice as much space as Kosygin's and Podgorny's. The local Moskovskaya Pravda on 12 June carried the full text of the speeches by Kosygin and Podgorny, although the previous day it had carried the shorter version of Kosygin's speech published in the central press. Radio Moscow broadcast the speeches of the three top leaders live and in full. The central press and Radio Moscow carried the speeches by the other leaders excerpted and summarized in accordance with their rank.

46. Another sign of deference to Brezhnev was the almost standard references to him by the other leaders. They most frequently cited his addresses

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at the Lenin centennial celebrations in April and at the December plenum. Only Masharov, Shelest, Mzhavanadze, and Kulakov seem to have skipped this formality. (There is more doubt in Kulakov's case because only a very abbreviated version of his speech was published. No reference to Brezhnev appeared in Ponomarev's published remarks, but one was heard in a broadcast of his speech.)

47. The tone and substance of Brezhnev's speech reflected his authority. He was the most informative speaker concerning the new, yet incomplete, five-year plan. He took strong stands on most subjects, which, at the sacrifice of total consistency, allowed him to identify with all groups on one question or another. It also meant that on a particular question he sometimes found himself seemingly with a minority. The image conveyed was of a forceful conventionality with some openness to change.

48. Podgorny's speech was distinguished by its more rigid conventionality and its inflexibility. His ineffectual discussion of the role of the soviets seemed to reflect the limitations of his position.

49. Kosygin, in his comprehensive treatment of economic development during his term, demonstrated a grasp of detail and sureness of policy rarely found in the speeches of Politburo members. But on most points relating to the future--whether the shape of the new five-year plan, the claims of the consumer sector, the principles and prospects of economic reform, or the promotion of East-West relations--he appeared in retreat. He has not been a part of the agricultural lobby which was displaying its assertiveness and has since succeeded in nailing down agricultural investment at a central committee plenum on 2-3 July. In short, his speech, in its aloofness from current domestic issues and in its limited expression of individuality, did not seem quite to fit with the premiership.

50. The speeches of the other leaders seemed divided between the dynamic and the sterile. The

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statements of Polyansky, Mazurov, Masherov, and Shelest were distinguished by a thrust consistent enough to suggest identifiable programs. There is no question, for example, about Polyansky's championship of agriculture. In addition, his comments on cadres placement and style of leadership could be read as some lightly camouflaged self-promotion. The Belorussians and the Ukrainian first secretary appeared to have joined forces on behalf of some form of "scientific management." These leaders at least presented the picture of aggressiveness and of aiming for greater things.

51. This image was not conveyed by the other speakers. Pravda's shortened and unimpressive version of Kirilenko's speech raises doubt about how fairly it reported his presentation. Suslov's and Pelshe's dogmatic recitals of the ills of capitalist society bespoke the indulgence of those who have already arrived. Shelepin's mixture of science and discipline did not appear to go anywhere. Voronov's insistent penny-pinching resulted in an over-all negativism. Mzhavanadze's speech was noteworthy for saying absolutely nothing, as reported in Pravda, and for not being published in a fuller version in the Georgian press.

52. Whichever way the issues and personalities are added up, they generally produce a balance. The coalescence on the question of improving agricultural investments should impel movement on other issues involving losses and payoffs for other interests. A point of imbalance was the superior position of Brezhnev versus the receding stance of Kosygin. The speeches leave the impression, however, that the general policy impasse will not be broken until there is some reshuffling of officeholders.

# APPENDIX A—SOVIET LEADERS' ELECTION SPEECHES, 1970

Leader	Place	Date
L. I. Brezhnev member, Politburo General Secretary, Central Committee	Moscow	12 June
N. V. Podgorny member, Politburo Chairman, Presidium of the Supreme Soviet	Moscow	11 June
A. N. Kosygin member, Politburo Chairman, Council of Ministers	Moscow	10 June
M. A. Suslov member, Politburo Secretary, Central Committee	Leningrad	9 June
G. I. Voronov member, Politburo Chairman, RSFSR Council of Ministers	Novosibirsk	8 June
D. F. Ustinov (letter read to electorate meeting) candidate member, Politburo Secretary, Central Committee	Izhevsk	8 June
A. P. Kirilenko member, Politburo Secretary, Central Committee	Sverdlovsk	5 June
V. P. Mzhavanadze candidate member, Politburo First Secretary, Georgian Central Committee	Tbilisi	5 June
K. T. Mazurov member, Politburo First Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers	Minsk	4 June
A. N. Shelepin member, Politburo Chairman, All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions	Leningrad	4 June

F. D. Kulakov Secretary, Central Committee	Stavropol	4 June
D. S. Polyansky member, Politburo First Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers	Krasnodar	3 June
A. Ya. Pelshe member, Politburo Chairman, Party Control Committee	Riga	3 June
M. S. Solomentsev Secretary, Central Committee	Shakhty	3 June
K. F. Katushev Secretary, Central Committee	Gorky	3 June
P. N. Demichev candidate member, Politburo Secretary, Central Committee	Moscow	2 June
B. N. Ponomarev Secretary, Central Committee	Kalinin	2 June
I. V. Kapitonov Secretary, Central Committee	Kineshma	2 June
P. Ye. Shelest member, Politburo First Secretary, Ukrainian Central Committee	Kiev	1 June
Yu. V. Andropov candidate member, Politburo Chairman, Committee of State Security	Stupino	1 June
V. V. Grishin candidate member, Politburo First Secretary, Moscow City Party Committee	Moscow	29 May
Sh. R. Rashidov candidate member, Politburo First Secretary, Uzbekistan Central Committee	Tashkent	29 May

P. M. Masherov candidate member, Politburo First Secretary, Belorussian Central Committee	Minsk	28 May
V. V. Shcherbitsky candidate member, Politburo Chairman, Ukrainian Council of Ministers	Kiev	27 May
D. A. Kunayev candidate member, Politburo First Secretary, Kazakhstan Central Committee	Alma-Ata	27 May

**\* Note to Appendices B and C**

These tables are provided as an aid and guide in relating leaders and issues. A measure of subjectivity and arbitrariness, of course, enters into the construction of such a schematic outline. In general, explanations for the groupings under each topic are contained in the text. Where the available version of a speech leaves great doubt about the author's position on a topic, his name is omitted. Ustinov and Mzhavanadze, therefore, never appear.

# APPENDIX B—RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS\*

Agricultural Investment			
Opposes			Supports
Voronov Shcherbitsky	Kosygin Mazurov Shelepin Shelest Kapitonov Katushev	Podgorny Suslov Kirilenko Pelshe Masherov Kunayev Rashidov Demichev Solomentsev	Brezhnev Polyansky Kulakov
Industry			
Heavy			Consumer
Brezhnev Podgorny	Masherov Kunayev Rashidov	Kosygin Suslov Kirilenko Mazurov Polyansky Shelepin Pelshe Voronov Shelest Demichev Solomentsev Shcherbitsky	
Defense			
Supports			Ignores
Suslov	Brezhnev Kosygin Podgorny Kirilenko	Shelest Kunayev Ponomarev	Mazurov Polyansky Shelepin Pelshe Voronov Masherov Shcherbitsky Rashidov

# **APPENDIX C—ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT\***

1965 Reform			
<b>Ignores</b>			<b>Supports</b>
Suslov Kirilenko Shelest Masherov all others	Brezhnev	Podgorny Polyansky Shelepin Pelshe Voronov	Kosygin Mazurov
Science and Technology			
<b>Ignores</b>			<b>Stresses</b>
Polyansky Rashidov	Suslov Pelshe Voronov Andropov Kapitonov Katushev Shcherbitsky	Brezhnev Podgorny Kirilenko Mazurov Shelepin Kunayev Grishin Demichev Solomentsev	Kosygin Shelest Masherov
Scientific Management			
<b>Unsympathetic</b>			<b>Supports</b>
Podgorny Suslov Kirilenko Polyansky Shelepin Pelshe Andropov Rashidov Kapitonov Solomentsev	Kosygin Voronov Grishin Shcherbitsky Demichev	Kunayev Katushev	Brezhnev Mazurov Shelest Masherov